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Abstract
Electrophysiological and brain imaging studies show a somatotopic activation
of the pre- motor cortex while subjects process action verbs. This somatotopic
motor activation has been taken as an indication that the meaning of action
verbs is embedded in motor repre- sentations. However, discrepancies in the
literature led to the alternative hypothesis that motor representations are activated
during the course of a mental imagery process emerg- ing only after the meaning
of the action has been accessed. In order to address this issue, we asked
participants to decide whether a visually presented verb was concrete or abstract
by pressing a button or a pedal (primary task) and then to provide a distinct vocal
response to low and high sounds played soon after the verb display (secondary
task). Manipulations of the visual display (lower vs. uppercase), verb imageability
(concrete vs. abstract), verb meaning (hand vs. foot-related), and response
effector (hand vs. foot) allowed us to trace t...
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a b s t r a c t
Electrophysiological and brain imaging studies show a somatotopic activation of the pre-
motor cortex while subjects process action verbs. This somatotopic motor activation has
been taken as an indication that the meaning of action verbs is embedded in motor repre-
sentations. However, discrepancies in the literature led to the alternative hypothesis that
motor representations are activated during the course of a mental imagery process emerg-
ing only after the meaning of the action has been accessed. In order to address this issue,
we asked participants to decide whether a visually presented verb was concrete or abstract
by pressing a button or a pedal (primary task) and then to provide a distinct vocal response
to low and high sounds played soon after the verb display (secondary task). Manipulations
of the visual display (lower vs. uppercase), verb imageability (concrete vs. abstract), verb
meaning (hand vs. foot-related), and response effector (hand vs. foot) allowed us to trace
the perceptual, semantic and response stages of verb processing. We capitalized on the
psychological refractory period (PRP), which implies that the initiation of the secondary
task should be delayed only by those factors that slow down the central decision process
in the primary task. In line with this prediction, our results showed that the time cost
resulting from the processing of abstract verbs, when compared to concrete verbs, was still
observed in the subsequent response to the sounds, whereas the overall advantage of hand
over foot responses did not inﬂuence sound judgments. Crucially, we also observed a verb-
effector compatibility effect (i.e., foot-related verbs are responded faster with the foot and
hand-related verbs with the hand) that contaminated the performance of the secondary
task, providing clear evidence that motor interference from verb meaning occurred during
the central decision stage. These results cannot be explained by a mental imagery process
that would deploy only during the execution of the response to verb judgments. They
rather indicate that the motor activation induced by action verbs accompanies the
lexico-semantic processes leading to response selection.
 2014 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
1. Introduction
Words describing body actions (e.g. to hammer) convey
information about concrete gestures that can be performed
by every individual, with little variability, because they are
constrained by universal biomechanical rules. Recent evi-
dence suggests that this tight relationship between action
words and bodily experience inﬂuences their conceptual
representation in the human brain. Indeed, fMRI studies
showed that action verb processing induces somatotop-
ically organized patterns of activation in the frontal lobe.
Verbs describing leg movements elicit activity in the
superior frontal gyrus and in the dorso-medial aspect of
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.cognition.2014.10.004
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the precentral gyrus, whereas arm- and face-related verbs
activate the middle and inferior frontal gyri (Hauk,
Johnsrude, & Pulvermüller, 2004; Pulvermüller, Härle, &
Hummel, 2001). Such a homunculus-like activation was
also observed when action words were embedded in literal
(Aziz-Zadeh, Wilson, Rizzolatti, & Iacoboni, 2006;
Tettamanti et al., 2005) or idiomatic sentences
(Boulenger, Hauk, & Pulvermüller, 2009; Boulenger,
Shtyrov, & Pulvermüller, 2011). Because no overt move-
ments were permitted in these studies, the distinct pattern
of frontal activity evoked by action words was assumed to
reﬂect the contribution of motor representations to lexico-
semantic processing (Hauk, Shtyrov, & Pulvermüller, 2008;
Pulvermüller, 2005).
An alternative hypothesis suggests that the somatotopic
activation observed during action verb processing is a by-
product of mental imagery of action, which emerges only
after the meaning of the action has been accessed
(Boulenger et al., 2006; Postle, McMahon, Ashton,
Meredith, & de Zubicaray, 2008; Willems & Hagoort,
2007). Mental imagery of action is deﬁned as the genera-
tion of a complete action plan that is not executed but
can facilitate execution by shaping the motor system
(Jeannerod, 2001). To date, none of the two hypotheses
can be ﬁrmly disconﬁrmed: functional magnetic resonance
imaging (fMRI) indicates that, within the primary motor
and premotor cortex, there is little overlap in activation
induced by lexical decisions on action verbs or explicit
mental imagery of the same actions (Willems, Hagoort, &
Casasanto, 2010). Transcranial magnetic stimulation
(TMS) over the left primary motor cortex was found to
facilitate mental imagery of action verbs but not lexical
judgments on the same verbs (Tomasino, Fink, Sparing,
Dafotakis, & Weiss, 2008), although a relative difference
was found between arm- and leg-related verbs when
TMS was applied distinctively over the hand or foot motor
area (Pulvermüller, Hauk, Nikulin, & Ilmoniemi, 2005). A
close look at the time course of body-related changes dur-
ing action verb processing also reveals discrepancies. The
ﬁnding that corticospinal (CS) excitability changes during
the latest stages of action word recognition supports the
assumption that motor activation arises as a consequence
of a mental imagery process emerging only after action
identiﬁcation (Papeo, Vallesi, Isaja, & Rumiati, 2009). How-
ever, electroencephalographical (EEG) and magneto-
encephalographical (MEG) studies indicate that the motor
content of action words already inﬂuences frontal activity
within 150–250 ms (Hauk et al., 2008; Hauk &
Pulvermüller, 2004; Pulvermüller, Härle, & Hummel,
2001; Pulvermüller, 2005; Pulvermüller, Shtyrov, &
Ilmoniemi, 2005; Shtyrov, Hauk, & Pulvermüller, 2004;
van Elk, van Schie, Zwaan, & Bekkering, 2010). The ﬁnding
that the subliminal display of hand/arm-related verbs
affects the preparation of upcoming hand movements pro-
vides further support for an early crosstalk between
semantic processing and motor activation, which cannot
be ascribed to explicit imagery of the actions (Boulenger,
Silber et al., 2008).
In the present study, we used a dual-task experiment to
evidence activation of body-speciﬁc representations dur-
ing action verb judgments and we capitalized on the
well-known phenomenon of the psychological refractory
period (PRP; Pashler, 1994; Telford, 1931) to test whether
such activation emerges at the central stage, during lexico-
semantic processing and response selection, or at the
motor stage, after the meaning has been accessed and
the response selected. When two tasks are presented
simultaneously (or sequentially at a short interval), a delay
in the execution of the second task is systematically
observed. This interference effect (also referred to as the
PRP) occurs because the central response selection stage
of two tasks cannot occur in parallel. The central response
selection stage refers to any process involved in the map-
ping of perceptual information onto motor responses,
including lexico-semantic processing and selection of the
adequate response. In the present experiment, participants
had ﬁrst to decide whether a visually presented verb
(displayed in either upper or lower case fonts) was con-
crete or abstract by pressing a button or a pedal; second,
they had to provide a distinct vocal response to low and
high sounds played immediately after the verb display. A
stimulus-onset asynchrony (SOA) of 150 ms was used in
half of the trials to create interference between tasks,
whereas the SOA was set to 900 ms in the other half to
obtain a baseline measure of sound discrimination. Sound
judgment was used as a probe task to create an attentional
bottleneck and differentiate between the central response
selection stage and the motor execution stage of the verb
judgment task (for a similar approach, see Gaskell,
Quinlan, Tamminen, & Cleland, 2008; Sigman & Dehaene,
2005). Within an interference dual-task regime, the pres-
ence or absence of a time cost in sound judgment thus
indicates whether the processes at work during verb judg-
ment reﬂect either central or motor execution stages of
processing.
In the verb judgment task, we expected that lower case
stimuli should be processed faster than upper case stimuli
for perceptual reasons (Perea & Rosa, 2002), whereas
motor conduction times should lead to faster responses
with the hand compared to the foot (Rothwell, 1997). In
line with the well-established reaction time (RT) advan-
tage of concrete over abstract words in lexico-semantic
tasks (Binder, Westbury, McKiernan, Possing, & Medler,
2005; de Groot, 1989; James, 1975; Kroll & Merves,
1986; Rubin, 1980; Whaley, 1978), we predicted faster
responses to concrete verbs because they are more image-
able than abstract ones (Paivio, 1986). Finally, and cru-
cially, the somatotopic motor activation hypothesis for
action verb processing (Pulvermüller, 2005) predicts that
participants should press the pedal faster when concrete
verbs describe a foot-related action (e.g. walking), whereas
responses to hand-related verbs (e.g. writing) should be
faster when they imply a ﬁnger press. The aim of this study
was ﬁrst to test this prediction experimentally, and then to
determine the locus of this putative verb-response com-
patibility effect. A compatibility effect emerging during
the central stage would indicate that the motor represen-
tations associated with action verbs are active at the time
a decision is made about their concrete status and the hand
or foot is selected to respond. A compatibility effect emerg-
ing during the motor stage would indicate that the motor
representations associated with action verbs are activated
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during the execution of the response to verb judgments,
only after the meaning has been accessed and the correct
response selected. According to the PRP model
(Hesselman, Flandin, & Dehaene, 2011; Pashler, 1994;
Sigman & Dehaene, 2005; Telford, 1931), within an inter-
ference dual-task regime, the initiation of the secondary
task (i.e. sound processing) should be delayed only by
those factors that slow down the sensory and central deci-
sion process in the primary task (i.e. verb processing), but
not by factors that inﬂuence the mere response execution.
Thus, sound judgments should be delayed when verbs are
more difﬁcult to recognize (lower vs. uppercase) and to
understand (abstract vs. concrete), whereas pressing a but-
ton or a pedal should not affect the initiation of sound pro-
cessing because response programming can proceed in
parallel to a secondary task (see Fig. 1). Under the assump-
tion that motor activation accompanies the lexico-
semantic processes leading to response selection, the
verb-response compatibility effect should propagate to
subsequent sound judgments. Alternatively, if the verb-
response compatibility effect is a by-product of an explicit
mental imagery process that takes place at the response
execution stage, then sound judgments should reveal equal
RTs after compatible and incompatible trials because the
conﬂict between the verb meaning and the response effec-
tor is assumed to emerge after the time window concerned
by the PRP (see Fig. 1 for a schematic depiction of the pre-
dictions of the PRP). After testing these predictions, we
conducted correlation analyses to investigate further the
propagation of the aforementioned effects from the pri-
mary to the secondary task. We reasoned that if an effect
emerging at the level of the ﬁrst task propagates to a
subsequent task, the size of the propagation should be pro-
portional to the size of the effect itself. In other words, the
delay preceding response in the secondary task (sound
judgments) should increase as a function of the effect size
in the primary task (verb judgments).
2. Methods
2.1. Participants
Sixteen Italian-speaking students of the University of
Trento (14 female, right-handed, age: 20 ± 3 years) partici-
pated to the dual-task experiment against course credits.
Their vision was normal or corrected to normal.
2.2. Stimuli
Verbal stimuli consisted in 48 abstract and 48 concrete
verbs presented in the inﬁnitive form either in upper or
lower case (Courrier New, 18). Half of the concrete verbs
were related to an action performed with the foot and
the other half to hand movements. The lemma’s frequency
was (mean ± SD) 16.6 ± 23.5 for abstract verbs, 17.8 ± 26.7
for foot-related verbs and 17.6 ± 27.6 for hand-related
verbs, according to the corpus and frequency lexicon of
written Italian (CoLFIS, see http://www.istc.cnr.it/group-
page/databases; Laudanna, Thornton, Brown, Burani, &
Marconi, 1995). The average number of letters (±SD) was
8.3 ± 1.4 for abstract verbs, 8.5 ± 1.7 for foot-related verbs,
and 8.3 ± 1.4 for hand-related verbs. Independent t-tests
showed no difference in written frequency or number of
letters between the three verb categories (t < 1, p > .5 for
all comparisons). Because the corpus did not provide infor-
mation about word imageability, we asked eighteen Italian
speakers (15 female, age: 22 ± 4 years) who did not partic-
ipate in the main study to rate how easily each verb evokes
a vivid mental image or a vivid sensory-motor experience
(1 = very difﬁcult; 7 = very easy). Independent t-tests
showed that abstract verbs (3.2 ± 1) were less imageable
than hand-related (5.7 ± 0.9; t(70) = 14.57, p < .001) and
foot-related verbs (5.7 ± 0.9; t(17) = 15.20, p < .001); no
difference was observed between hand-related and foot-
related verbs (t < 1, p > .5). Two sounds varying in pitch
(440 vs. 880 Hz) were generated for sound judgments.
2.3. Procedure
In each trial, a verbwas displayed for 150 ms on the com-
puter screen (1700) in black on a white background (maxi-
mum visual angle 5). A sound was played for 150 ms
either 0 or 750 ms after the verb offset. It was followed by
a ﬁxation cross that remained on the screen until the partic-
ipant’s response. Instructions required participants to
answer as fast as possible to the verb and then to the sound,
while keeping errors at minimum. In total, participants per-
formed768 trials divided in four blocks, resulting in 24 trials
for each relevant condition of concrete verb judgments
(case  verb meaning  response  stimulus-onset asyn-
chrony) and 48 trials for each relevant condition of abstract
verb judgments (case  response  stimulus-onset asyn-
chrony). In half of the blocks, participants were asked to
press a button with their right hand in response to abstract
verbs and to press a pedalwith their right foot in response to
concrete verbs, whereas the reverse stimulus-response
mappingwas used in the other half. These instructionswere
counter-balanced across blocks following an ABBA or BAAB
order. Moreover, participants had to say ‘‘bi’’ in response to
high sounds and ‘‘bo’’ in response to low sounds. The exper-
imenter encoded the response for off-line analysis and trig-
gered the next trial. In order to ensure that participants
were familiar with the stimulus-response mapping before
starting each block, they performed 24 practice trials with
different verbs than those displayed in the rest of the exper-
iment and instructionswere remindedwhenever theymade
errors. No feedback was given to the participants after the
practice trials. In each of the four experimental blocks, the
96 verbs were presented twice in a random order; all verbs
were ﬁrst presented once before the repetition of any of
them so that repetition was kept orthogonal to all condi-
tions. Within a block, each combination of verb case,
abstractness, response and stimulus-onset asynchrony
(SOA) was presented equally often in association with high
or lowsounds. The stimulus onset and the recordingofman-
ual and pedal responses were controlled by the E-prime
software (Psychology Software Tools, Sharpsburg, USA). A
microphone connected to E-prime was used to detect the
onset of verbal responses.
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2.4. Data analysis
Analyses were performed on the median RTs after
removing error trials (8%) and trials where the microphone
failed to detect the verbal response (3%). Error trials
included trials where participants gave an incorrect
answer in one or both tasks. RTs refer to the delay between
the verb display and the button/pedal response in the pri-
mary task, and to the delay between the sound onset and
the verbal response in the secondary task. Two participants
were discarded from the analysis because their data
showed that they did not follow the instructions that
required to answer as fast as possible to the verb and then
to the sound. One participant answered to the primary task
several hundred milliseconds after the sound onset irre-
spective of the SOA, whereas the other answered to the
secondary task before the primary task in 54% of the trials.
For similar reasons, trials where RTs to the primary task
were higher than 1500 ms (<3%) and trials where the
secondary task was performed ﬁrst (<2%) were excluded
from the analysis. A ﬁrst ANOVA was conducted on the
median RTs in verb judgments with case (lower vs. upper),
imageability (concrete vs. abstract), response (button vs.
pedal) and SOA (150 vs. 900 ms) as within-subject factors.
The RTs measured in response to concrete verbs only were
entered in a second ANOVA with verb meaning (hand-
related vs. foot-related), response (button vs. pedal) and
SOA (150 vs. 900 ms) as within-subject factors. In order
to test the predictions of the PRP model, median RTs in
sound judgments were analyzed as a function of the same
factors as for the primary task. Planned comparisons
between foot-related and hand-related verbs were per-
formed separately for each response using one-tailed
paired t-tests. Because comparisons were orthogonal and
did not exceed the number of two, a was set at an uncor-
rected level of .05 per comparison. Finally, we measured
effect sizes in the two tasks in an interference (SOA
150 ms) or a non-interference regime (SOA 900 ms) by
Fig. 1. Schematic representation of the psychological refractory period in the present experiment (A). Sound judgment (task 2) was used as a probe task to
create an attentional bottleneck and differentiate between perceptual, central or motor stages of verb judgment (task 1). Perceptual stages were tracked by
indexing the time cost resulting from the display of upper-case (‘‘WRITE’’) vs. lower-case (‘‘write’’) verbs; central stages were tracked by indexing the time
cost resulting from the processing of abstract (‘‘think’’) vs. concrete (‘‘write’’) verbs; motor stages were tracked by indexing the time cost resulting from the
programming of foot (pedal) vs. hand (button) responses. According to the PRP model, sound judgment should be delayed when verbs are more difﬁcult to
recognize (B) and to understand (C), whereas pressing a button or a pedal should not affect the initiation of sound judgment because response programming
can proceed in parallel to a secondary task (D).
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computing individual RT differences (dRTs) between: (1)
upper and lowercase conditions; (2) abstract and concrete
conditions; (3) incompatible and compatible trials; (4)
pedal and button responses. For each effect, subjects
(N = 14) were ranked according to the size of their dRTS
in verb and sound judgments and the correlation between
the two tasks was estimated separately for the interference
and non-interference regime using Spearman’s coefﬁcient
(p < .05).
3. Results
3.1. Primary task: verb judgments
There was no RT difference between the verb judg-
ments performed in close proximity with the sound onset
and those performed with a longer time asynchrony
(765 ± 18 versus 778 ± 20 ms), conﬁrming that participants
answered to the primary task independently of the sound
onset in the secondary task (F(1,13) = 2.94, p > .1).
Although lowercase words (769 ± 18 ms) were identiﬁed
faster than uppercase words (774 ± 19 ms), the main effect
of case was not signiﬁcant (F(1,13) = 3.4, p > .09). Abstract
verbs (790 ± 20 ms) took more time to be processed than
concrete verbs (753 ± 20 ms), as evidenced by the main
effect of imageability (F(1,13) = 6.6, p < .02). The response
effect (F(1,13) = 60.7, p < .001) showed that foot move-
ments (814 ± 20 ms) were executed more slowly than
hand movements (728 ± 18 ms). None of these effects
interacted with the SOA (all p-values > .1).
In order to test the relationship between the meaning of
action verbs and the motor representations, we conducted
a second ANOVA on the RTs gathered in response to con-
crete verbs that could be hand- or foot-related. Results
showed a main effect of verb meaning (F(1,13) = 5.3,
p < .04) and response (F(1,13) = 7.8, p < .02) as well as an
interaction between these two factors (F(1,13) = 19.4,
p < .001). As shown in Fig. 2, the two-way interaction
revealed that participants pressed the button with their
hand faster in response to hand- than foot-related verbs
(t(13) = 2.87, p < .01), whereas foot-related verbs led to fas-
ter pedal responses than hand-related verbs (t(13) = 5.01,
p < .001). The verb meaning-response compatibility effect
did not interact with the SOA (F(1,13) = 0.08, p > .8). Over-
all, foot-related verbs showed a 42 ± 8 ms advantage over
hand-related verbs when the response involved a pedal
press, whereas hand-related verbs showed a 25 ± 9 ms
advantage over foot-related verbs when the response
involved a button press; the verb meaning-response com-
patibility effect was more pronounced for pedal than but-
ton presses (t(13) = 2.3, p < .05).
3.2. Secondary task: sound judgments
The ﬁrst ANOVA performed on sound judgments
revealed a main effect of SOA (F(1,13) = 982, p < .001) :
RTs were longer for an SOA of 150 ms (1176 ± 38 ms) than
for an SOA of 900 ms (648 ± 30 ms), indicating that the ini-
tiation of the secondary task was delayed by the concur-
rent processing of the verb in the primary task at the
shortest SOA. Moreover, as predicted by the PRP model,
this delay was inﬂuenced by the lexico-semantic process
underlying response selection in verb judgments. Indeed,
a signiﬁcant interaction between imageability and SOA
(F(1,13) = 5.5, p < .04) showed that, when sounds and verbs
were presented with an asynchrony of 150 ms, abstract
verbs slowed down the initiation of sound judgments
when compared to concrete verbs (t(13) = 2.04, p < .05).
The relative time cost of abstract verb processing vanished
when an SOA of 900 ms separated the two tasks
(t(13) = 1.07, p > .2). Finally, sound judgments were faster
after pressing a button (888 ± 32 ms) than after pressing
a pedal (936 ± 35 ms; F(1,13) = 21.6, p < .001) but, in con-
trast with the imageability effect, this response effect
was observed irrespective of the time elapsed between
the verb and the sound onset (F(1,13) = 0.7, p > .4). All
other effects and interactions were not signiﬁcant (all
p-values > .1).
The second ANOVA aimed at testing the impact of the
verb meaning-response compatibility effect in trials where
the sound was preceded by a concrete verb. Results
showed a signiﬁcant interaction between verb meaning
and response (F(1,13) = 10.6, p < .006) that was integrated
in a three-way interaction with SOA (F(1,13) = 5.6, p < .04).
The three-way interaction indicated that, when the SOA
was 150 ms, the delay induced by the incompatibility
between the verb meaning and the response propagated
to sound judgments (F(1,13) = 11.7 p < .005). As illustrated
in Fig. 3, the initiation of sound judgments was delayed
when participants had to perform a button press in
response to foot-related verbs when compared to hand-
related verbs (t(13) = 2.43, p < .015), whereas verb
meaning had the opposite effect in trials where sound
judgments followed a pedal response (t(13) = 2.20,
p < .025). Sound judgments were 45 ± 18 ms faster after
pressing a button in response to hand-related verbs com-
pared to foot-related verbs, whereas a 33 ± 15 ms advan-
tage was observed after pressing the pedal in response to
foot-related verbs compared to hand-related verbs. The
Fig. 2. Interaction between verb meaning and response effector during
concrete verb judgments. Error bars show within-subject corrected
standard errors (Loftus & Masson, 1994) and asterisks signal signiﬁcant
differences between conditions (⁄p < 0.05).
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verb meaning-response compatibility effect had a similar
impact on sound judgments whether the response
required a button or a pedal press (t(13) = .49, p > .63).
No compatibility effect was observed with an SOA of
900 ms (F(1,13) = 3.4, p > .09).
3.3. Correlations between tasks
In the short SOA condition, a signiﬁcant correlation for
the case (r = .66, t(13) = 3.09, p < .009) and imageability
effects (r = .87, t(13) = 6.19, p < .001) was found, indicating
that, under an interference regime, the impact of linguistic
manipulations on individual RTs in the primary task was
predictive of individual differences in RTs in the secondary
task (see Fig. 4). When the SOA was 900 ms, no correlation
was observed between the estimates of the case effect
(r = .07, t(13) = .25, p > .8), and the correlation between
the estimates of the imageability effect was only marginal
(r = .53, t(13) = 2.1, p > .06). Although previous analyses
indicated that response execution did not interfere with
the initiation of the secondary task, a weak correlation
was found between the response effect when the two tasks
were performed with a short SOA of 150 ms (r = .62,
t(13) = 2.72, p < .02; see Fig. 4). Because this correlation
might be inﬂuenced by the strength of the compatibility
effect during action verb processing, we restricted the
analysis to the trials where the sound was preceded by
an abstract verb. In these trials, the correlation between
the response effects measured in the two tasks did not
exceed 0.21 (t(13) = .74, p > .5). Finally, individual esti-
mates of the verb meaning-response compatibility effect
correlated between tasks when the sound was presented
150 ms after the verb (r = .73, t(13) = 3.72, p < .003) but
not when it was presented 900 ms later (r = .46;
t(13) = 1.77, p > .1; see Fig. 4). When looking at the compat-
ibility effect for each type of response effector separately,
the correlation was slightly higher for button (r = .75,
t(13) = 3.92, p < .002) than for pedal responses (r = .51,
t(13) = 2.04, p > 0.06).
4. Discussion
The present study showed that semantic judgments
about action verbs induce activation of body-part speciﬁc
representations. A verb meaning-response compatibility
effect demonstrated that hand-related verbs elicited faster
hand responses than foot-related verbs, whereas the pro-
cessing of foot-related verbs facilitated foot responses
when compared to hand-related verbs. Results further
indicate that motor representations are activated within
the psychological refractory period, thus during the time
window where participants are accessing the meaning of
verbs and are deciding if they are concrete or abstract. This
means that the motor activation induced by action verbs is
not an epiphenomenon occurring only after participants
have processed verb meaning, while they are executing
their response.
Our paradigm required performing button or pedal
presses in response to concrete or abstract verbs and then
to provide a distinct verbal response to low and high
sounds. In the primary task, the SOA did not affect verb
judgments, conﬁrming that subjects answered as fast as
possible irrespective of the sound presentation. Access to
the semantic representation of abstract verbs was assumed
to be more difﬁcult because these verbs are less imageable
than concrete verbs (Paivio, 1986). Results showed that
lexico-semantic processing was indeed slower for abstract
than concrete verbs. Moreover, response execution was
slower with the foot than with the hand, reﬂecting longer
conduction times for lower limb movements (Rothwell,
1997). We thought that manipulating the verb case would
allow us to interfere with perceptual processes because
letters are easier to discriminate in lowercase than in
uppercase words (Perea & Rosa, 2002). In the present task,
lowercase verbs were processed faster than uppercase
verbs but the difference was not signiﬁcant, probably due
to the high automatization of upper-case reading in our
highly educated subjects. Importantly, judgments of con-
crete verbs were faster when the verb meaning and the
motor response implied a movement of the same body
Fig. 3. Verb meaning-response compatibility effect observed in sound judgments following the presentation of concrete verbs in an interference (SOA
150 ms, left panel) or a non-interference regime (SOA 900 ms, right panel).
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part. This verb meaning-response compatibility effect
appeared slightly more pronounced for foot than hand
responses (but only in the verb task and not in the sound
task). The ﬁnding that action verb processing interacted
Fig. 4. Relationship between the same effects measured in the two tasks in an interference (SOA 150 ms, left panel) or a non-interference regime (SOA
900 ms, right panel) for each participant. RT differences (dRTs) were computed individually to estimate the effect of case (uppercase vs. lowercase),
imageability (abstract vs. concrete), verb meaning-response compatibility (incompatible vs. compatible), and response (pedal vs. button). In each graph,
participants (N = 14) were ranked according to the size of their dRTS in verb judgments (X axis) and sound judgments (Y axis).
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more strongly with activation of foot than hand motor
responses might indicate that sensorimotor experience is
particularly important for understanding foot-related
verbs. Pulvermüller, Hauk, et al. (2005) suggested that
foot-related verbs are more dependent on motor represen-
tations than other body-related verbs because lower-limb
actions tend to be more similar to each other (e.g., walk,
run and jog involve many of the same movements).
Alternatively, our result might more simply reﬂect a ﬂoor
effect in the quick hand response pattern.
In the secondary task, we found that sounds presented
150 ms after the verb display took more time to be dis-
criminated than sounds presented 900 ms later. This delay
reﬂects the PRP induced by the concurrent processing of
verbs in the short SOA condition. In this condition,
responses to the sounds were slower after abstract than
concrete verb judgments, suggesting that sound discrimi-
nation could not be initiated before a decision was reached
about the semantic status of the verb. These results corrob-
orate the idea that, during verb judgments, lexico-semantic
processing constitutes a bottleneck that prevents the per-
formance of the other task. Regarding the inﬂuence of the
response effect in the secondary task, sounds were
answered faster when they followed a verb that required
a hand response rather than a foot response. However, this
advantage was observed not only in the dual-task condi-
tion but also in the control condition when the sound
was presented 900 ms after the verb. Therefore, the
propagation of this response effect is unlikely to reﬂect
attentional limitations at the level of the bottleneck. The
absence of interaction between response and SOA conﬁrms
that this effect arises outside the PRP, presumably at the
level of motor execution. In line with recent electrophysi-
ological results (Hauk & Pulvermüller, 2004; Hauk et al.,
2008; Pulvermüller, 2005; Pulvermüller, Shtyrov, &
Ilmoniemi, 2005; Pulvermüller et al., 2001; Shtyrov et al.,
2004), it is possible that the frequent association of hand
and mouth movements in speech facilitated the co-activa-
tion of their motor programs, allowing faster vocal
responses (required for sound judgments) after hand than
foot movements (required for verb judgments), irrespec-
tive of the SOA. The co-activation of hand and mouth
movements is further corroborated by the spatial proxim-
ity of their brain representation (Matelli & Luppino, 2001;
Rizzolatti, Luppino & Matelli, 1988) and by the ﬁnding that
CS excitability increases in hand – but not leg – muscles
while reading aloud (Meister et al., 2003).
The crucial issue, in the present study, was whether the
verb meaning-response compatibility effect would propa-
gate from the primary to the secondary task in dual-task
trials. Under the assumption that motor activation accom-
panies the lexico-semantic processes leading to response
selection, the verb-response compatibility effect should
affect sound judgments because the PRP predicts that the
central response selection stage must be completed before
another task can be initiated. Alternatively, if the verb-
response compatibility effect is a by-product of an explicit
mental imagery process emerging only at the response
execution stage, then sound judgments should reveal equal
RTs after compatible and incompatible trials because the
conﬂict between the verb meaning and the response
effector occurs outside the time window concerned by
the PRP. The three-way interaction between verb meaning,
response and SOA provides positive evidence for the
assumption of verb meaning interference at the central
response selection stage. When the verb meaning was
incompatible with the effector selected to perform verb
judgments, a delay was observed for sounds played imme-
diately after the verb display, whereas this effect was
absent at a larger SOA. This pattern of results clearly indi-
cates that the verb-response compatibility effect propa-
gates from the primary task to the secondary task,
supporting the view that interference from verb meaning
emerges at the central stage and can thus not be ascribed
to a mental imagery process taking place at the response
execution stage after the action concept has been
identiﬁed. In order to strengthen our conclusions, we
investigated whether propagation to the dual task was
proportional to the effect size in the primary task. This
analysis indicated that, in the short SOA condition, partic-
ipants showing the largest effects of perceptual and
semantic factors in the verb task were also the ones show-
ing the largest effects in the sound task; in the long SOA
condition, no correlation was observed, as predicted by
the absence of interference between the two tasks. It is
worth noting that, in the present paradigm, the effect of
verb case was also expected to inﬂuence the discrimination
of the forthcoming sound because word recognition is nec-
essary for lexico-semantic processing. Although this effect
was too small to reach signiﬁcance in the ANOVA, its inﬂu-
ence on verb judgments was sufﬁcient to be tracked in the
sound task using correlation methods.
It could be argued that the time interval deﬁned by the
RT difference between sound judgments performed after a
short (150 ms) and a long SOA (900 ms), which can be con-
sidered as an estimate of the PRP duration, is sufﬁciently
long to allow post-lexical imagery processes to take place
during word judgment. However, in the present study,
the PRP duration is not exclusively related to the central
stage of the primary task: it may be shorter or longer,
depending upon the relative duration of the perceptual
stages of the two tasks. Thus, our paradigm does not allow
to precisely deﬁning the duration of the different process-
ing stages. Independently from the exact temporal dura-
tion of the PRP, the critical contribution of our paradigm
comes from the fact that we can functionally separate cen-
tral decision making from post-decision making stages of
information processing. Our results show that motor inter-
ference from verb meaning occurs during the central stage
of lexical decision making, thereby excluding a mental
imagery process that would take place during response
execution after a decision has been made about the con-
crete status of the verbs.
We cannot exclude that action verbs primed motor rep-
resentations during the central response selection stage
because of the task requirements but we believe that the
experimental manipulation of the response effector was
required to reveal such a subtle interaction between lan-
guage and action at the behavioral level. The present study
demonstrates a minima that, in the context of semantic
judgments, action verbs activate motor representations
during response selection and not as a consequence of
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response selection. Our results also converge with other
results suggesting that motor activation induced by action
verbs is an early and automatic process that cannot be
explained by conscious processing of task requirements.
Previous electrophysiological results showed that the
motor content of action verbs inﬂuences frontal activity
as early as 200 ms post-stimulus onset (Hauk &
Pulvermüller, 2004; Hauk et al., 2008; Pulvermüller,
2005; Pulvermüller, Shtyrov et al., 2005, 2004). Kinematic
studies showed a timely effect of action verbs on the prep-
aration (Boulenger et al., 2006; Dalla Volta, Gianelli,
Campione, & Gentilucci, 2009; Mirabella, Iaconelli,
Spadacenta, Federico, & Gallese, 2012) or execution of
reaching movements (Dalla Volta et al., 2009; Nazir et al.,
2008), even when verbs were displayed subliminally
(Boulenger, Silber, et al., 2008), evidencing a continuous
and automatic crosstalk between language and action.
Other chronometric studies used a go – no go paradigm
to show that action verbs interfere with manual responses
when they are processed in close temporal proximity with
response production but these studies provided scarce evi-
dence for a somatotopic activation given that only manual
responses were tested (Marino, Gough, Gallese, Riggio, &
Buccino, 2013; Sato, Mengarelli, Riggio, Gallese, &
Buccino, 2008). More importantly, we knew there was an
early activation of motor representations by action verbs
in these studies but the functional locus of their interaction
was unknown. The present study showed a crossed
interaction between verb meaning (hand-related vs. foot-
related) and response effector (hand vs. foot), providing
indubitable evidence that the motor interference of action
verbs follows the somatotopic organization of motor repre-
sentations. Moreover, the use of the dual task allowed us to
track the functional locus of this interference at the central
response selection stage, thereby excluding a mental imag-
ery process that would deploy during response execution
after decision making.
Altogether, the present results rather suggest that
motor activation induced by action verbs accompanies
the lexico-semantic processes that lead to response selec-
tion. At the brain level, such an account of the verb-effector
compatibility effect implies that hand and foot motor rep-
resentations should be distinctively activated while read-
ing action verbs. As mentioned in the Introduction,
several studies showed that the frontal activation induced
by foot, hand or mouth-related verbs follows a medial-to-
lateral gradient reminiscent of the motor homunculus
(Aziz-Zadeh et al., 2006; Boulenger et al., 2009; Hauk
et al., 2004; Pulvermüller et al., 2001; Tettamanti et al.,
2005). However, a recent study showed that these activa-
tions lie mainly in higher-order premotor areas that repre-
sent information in a more abstract format than the
primary motor areas (Postle et al., 2008). This was taken
as evidence that the resources shared by motor control
and verb processing are unrelated to bodily experience
(Bedny & Caramazza, 2011). Whatever the exact neural
substrate of the reported sensorimotor compatibility
effect, the present study demonstrates that the motor
knowledge involved in action verb processing includes
some information about the body part associated with
the action. A speculative account for the inconsistencies
across the different published fMRI studies is that action
verb reading could be accompanied by an inhibition of
the motor cortex to prevent action execution, making
motor activity more difﬁcult to detect with conventional
fMRI analysis methods. This view ﬁts with the repetitive
involvement of the pre-supplementary motor area (SMA)
while deciphering the meaning of action verbs (Postle
et al., 2008; Willems et al., 2010). Indeed, this area is
known to play a role in controlling the release of an action
by the primary motor cortex (Forstmann et al., 2008;
Neubert, Mars, Buch, Olivier, & Rushworth, 2010).
A review of fMRI studies suggests that somatotopic acti-
vation is more obvious during sentence comprehension
(Aziz-Zadeh et al., 2006) than during word comprehension
(Postle et al., 2008). This observation has led to the
assumption that motor representations may contribute to
the building of detailed situation models rather than verb
comprehension itself (Bedny & Caramazza, 2011). Our
results go against this idea because the verb-response
compatibility effect was observed in semantic judgments
that do not require a contextualized representation of the
action. The compatibility effect reported here rather evi-
dences fast and automatic interactions between lexical
entries and motor representations. It should be noted,
however, that our results do not imply that the semantic
content of action verbs is solely dependent on motor repre-
sentations. Other non-motor knowledge is also activated as
part of the semantic representation of action verbs because
it has been shown that lesions of the motor system only
have moderate effects on lexico-semantic processing of
action verbs (Arévalo, Baldo, & Dronkers, 2010;
Boulenger, Mechtouff, et al., 2008; Papeo, Negri, Zadini, &
Rumiati, 2010).
5. Conclusion
We used the PRP as a tool to parcel out perceptual, cen-
tral and motor stages in verb judgments. Participants were
asked to judge hand- and foot-related verbs in a dual-task
context. Results provided unambiguous evidence for a verb
meaning – response effector compatibility effect while
judging action verbs. As predicted by the PRP, we found
that lexico-semantic processing, but not response execu-
tion, inﬂuenced the initiation of sound judgments per-
formed as a dual task. The verb-response compatibility
effect also affected the initiation of the dual task, indicating
that the motor interference of verb meaning cannot be
ascribed to a mental imagery process taking place at the
response execution stage after the action concept has been
identiﬁed.
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